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CULTURE, POSTMODERNISM, AND CANADIAN LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: A COMMENT ON REFERENCE
RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC
JoHN RICEt

I. INTRODUCTION:

CANADA, CULTURE,

POSTMODERNITY

&

POWER

When I was an undergraduate, I recall having heard Canada described as
the world's "first postmodern state" in a history seminar. The professor
who made this contention based this opinion on the fact that Canada is
unlike most of the world's nation-states in that it was founded and
structured to accommodate the needs and aspirations of two founding
"peoples," instead of one. At the time, I was quite taken with this idea. I
return to it now in order to explore and interrogate the "postmodernity"
of the Canadian polity and Canadian law. In the years since that history
seminar, Quebeckers have voted in a second sovereignty referendum,
and I feel that I have developed a more sophisticated understanding of
postmodern ideas and the (in)ability of the Canadian state to
accommodate cultural difference. I am no longer so optimistic that
Canadian law is capable of reconciling the often divergent demands of
liberal statehood and cultural pluralism.
To date, most culturally-based critiques of Canadian law have been
articulated with regard to the difficulties faced by First Nations in their
encounters with the law. Mary Ellen Turpel and others have argued
persuasively that the whole structure of Canadian law, with its complex
of ingrained cultural assumptions, militates against a genuine
recognition of the cultural difference of aboriginal peoples. Such a
recognition seems an impossibility to Turpel given the cun-ent state of
Canadian law, since it would reveal "a lack of interpretive authority in
legal reasoning and decision-making," and "problematize ... the rule of

t B.A. (University of Western Ontario), LL.B. anticipated 2000 (Dalhousie). I would like
to express my thanks to Professor Richard F. Devlin for the guidance he provided me in the
development of this topic and the writing of this comment, which is an edited version of a
longer paper I submitted to Prof. Devlin for his course in General Jurisprudence.
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law as one particular expression of social life." 1 While this failure of
Canadian law is deplorable, it is perhaps not surprising given the long
history of oppression and discrimination suffered by aboriginal people
and peoples in Canada. My goal in this paper is to determine whether the
inability of Canadian law to take proper notice of the cultural difference
of aboriginal peoples is an indication of a broader incapacity, and
whether the status of Quebec as a legal entity within Canada is limited in
similar ways.
The power differential between Canada's dominant (AngloCanadian) culture and aboriginal culture is obviously far more
pronounced than any possible differential between anglophone
Canadians and Quebec sovereigntists. I make no claim that the position
of Quebec in the Canadian constitutional order is in any way cognate to
that of the First Nations. Moreover, most of the arguments that I make
with regard to Quebec's relations with Anglo-Canadian culture would
be just as, if not more, effective in criticizing the relations between
Aboriginal nations and Quebec. Nevertheless, I do feel that the
arguments made by aboriginals and sovereigntists are similar in that
both groups hold up culture as an important, if not the pre-eminent,
principle both in criticizing the cun-ent operation of Canadian law and
proposing ways in which law should be transformed. In this paper I
examine a recent and already famous decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 2 the most recent in a long
series of legal negotiations of Quebec's status as a part of the Canadian
polity. I hope to demonstrate Canadian law's inability to give credence
to arguments that take culture as their starting point-an inability that
results in the occlusion of cultural difference from Canadian law.
In areas like the protection of language rights, the cultural import
of Quebec's constitutional arguments is obvious. However, in agitating
for constitutional change, Quebec has sought to gather to itself
jurisdiction and powers that are not easily subsumed under any simple
rubric like "cultural powers." As Jeremy Webber observes of division of
powers litigation involving Quebec and the federal government,

1
M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies,
Cultural Differences" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal The01y (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1991) 503 at 514.
2
[1998] S.C.R. [Q.L.], Court File 25506, 21August1998 [hereinafter Re Secession].
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[t]he restricted demand for additional, distinctively cultural powers
does not adequately account for the depth of Quebeckers' concerns
with the division of powers. In any case, Quebec's concerns clearly go
beyond the strictly cultural. 3

Nevertheless, there are cultural forces underlying Quebec's desire for
greater autonomy, be it within the federalist grundnorm or without, as is
contemplated in Re Secession. The government of Quebec, more than
any other provincial legal entity, can claim authority on the basis of
cultural difference because it is in Quebec that a minority culturallinguistic group can claim to have its own government within the federal
structure. The close association between the government of Quebec and
Canada's francophone minority gives Quebec's claims for greater
autonomy certain cultural weight. It has also posed a challenge to
advocates of a pan-Canadian identity, as there exists among citizens of
Quebec a distinct "asymmetry of allegiance" when compared to citizens
of other provinces. 4 Large numbers of Quebeckers, due to their
differences from the rest of Canada, typically view themselves as
Quebeckers first and Canadians second. Still, while Quebec's attempts
to shape Canadian constitutional law may be informed by cultural
imperatives, those cultural arguments are typically not made when
"cultural powers" are not in issue. However, in Re Secession, the
cultural content of Quebec's legal arguments was placed squarely
before the Supreme Court of Canada.
Before analyzing the Supreme Court's judgment in Re Secession of
Quebec, I will first set out the jurisprudential frame in which I intend to
place the decision. That frame is made up of two separate, but
interpenetrating, sets of ideas that are currently the subject of much
discussion in the project of "thinking about law." The first mode may be
loosely described as "cultural studies," and the second is
postmodernism.
Cultural studies jurisprudence sees law as a force in society that is
at once culturally constructed and culturally constructive. A body of
law, itself the product of a network of cultural influences, operates in
order to validate and protect the particular assumptions about cultural
identity held by the dominant culture in the jurisdiction where those
J. Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and the Canadian
Constitution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994) at 213.
4
Ibid. at 212.
3

186- DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

laws have effect. The relationship between culture and law is not
unidirectional or static; law and culture are mutually supportive.
Clifford Geertz describes this complex relationship:
[L]aw, rather than a mere add-on to a morally (or immorally) finished
society, is, along ... with a whole range of other cultural realities from
the symbolics of faith to the means of production, an active part of it. 5

If we accept Geertz's contention that law is a manifestation of culture
and is "constructive of social life not reflective, or anyway not just
reflective, of it,''6 then we must also transform our ideas about the
cultural significance of legal disputes. A cultural criticism of law treats
legal disputes as "contests over how to represent society or its parts,
expressive contests of meaning rather than instrumental contests over
resources." 7 As such, legal disputes are discursive confrontations,
competitions over what legal language means.
In legal studies, as in many academic disciplines, it has become
almost commonplace to treat the signifying power of language with a
great deal of scepticism. Following the deconstructionist project most
often associated with Jacques Derrida, this scepticism rejects
logocentrism and its contention that language can convey any
immediate experience of reality or truth. Instead, users and interpreters
of language, such as lawyers and judges, operate in a field composed of
language, and their statements of law can have no actual connection to a
stable referent like reality or truth. The effect of this realization is to
challenge many of the claims to authority that powerful speakers make
by virtue of their positions as expert or judge. The authority such
speakers do possess exists because they use a dominant legal discourse
that remains dominant because it is more powerful than other
discourses, not because it is more true. 8 This discursive power can flow
from a particular discourse's alignment with a set of cultural
assumptions and standards shared by a powerful group in a given
jurisdiction. So, if we accept the presence and legitimacy of cultural
5 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in l11te1pretive Anthropology (New York:
Basic Books, 1983) at 218.
6
Ibid.
7
G. Binder & R. Weisberg, "Cultural Criticism of Law" (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1149 at
1167.
8
R. Devlin, "Law, Postmodemism and Resistance: Rethinking the Significance of the Irish
Hunger Strike" (1994) 14 Windsor Y.B. of Access Just. 3 at 7.
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difference, as well as the culturally-grounded nature of virtually any
system of laws, cultural studies jurisprudence presents a potentially
intractable quandary. In order to claim legitimacy in a culturally
heterogeneous society, law must be able to make space for cultural
difference. However, how can law take account of the potentially
enormous variety of cultural perspectives present in pluralistic societies
and yet retain the universality and uniformity of treatment that
characterizes the liberal conception of the rule of law?
The answer to this rhetorical question is that law as it is conceived
of in liberal democracies may not be capable of accepting cultural
differences. This inability may be seen as one manifestation of an idea
that characterizes many postmodern critiques of law. Postmodern legal
theorists have often taken as one of their starting points a repudiation of
the modem idea of progress. They are sceptical about law's ability to
improve over time, gradually reconciling and achieving the various
goals held by individuals and groups in heterogeneous societies. For the
purposes of my analysis, one of the most imp01iant ways in which law
frustrates progress is in its tendency to create totalizing meta-narratives.
Narrative is a powerful and highly seductive means of explaining
human activity. It can lend structure and coherence ("virtues" that are
often associated with constitutionalism and the rule oflaw) to that which
is chaotic and incoherent. However, as attractive as narrative may be, it
is an inadequate means of understanding and representing reality,
because the structure it imposes cannot "do justice" to the complexity of
postmodern existence. As Costas Douzinas explains,
[t]he phenomenal world, past or present, does not appear in the form of
a closed segment, with beginning and end. On the contrary, we swim
in incoherent streams of events and sequences that have no clear line
of development and connection. 9

Still, the will to narrate remains central to legal reasoning, because it
renders the operation of law intelligible. Narrative is perhaps the most
effective cognitive tool in law's arsenal, because it "emplots the
diffusion and dispersal of lived experience as the facts of a moral
drama." 10 This kind of emplotment can lend persuasive force to words
9
C. Douzinas, Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the Texts of Law
(London: Routledge, 1991) at 106.
10
Ibid. at 107.
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that would otherwise be susceptible to competing interpretations. Thus
the power of law is the power to emplot social phenomena and thereby
contain and control them within legal narratives.
The narratives that law creates are contingent-they depend for
their signifying power upon cultural norms and assumptions. So when
other cultures propose alternative narratives or discursive modes, legal
proceedings where the parties articulate two divergent cultural
standpoints may be seen as competitions between those discursive
modes. It is unlikely that any tribunal or court will be able to decide
"objectively" between two incommensurable cultural narratives: the
arbiter will inevitably have his or her own culturally conditioned
narrative or discursive preferences, but the success of the privileged
narrative mode is not always total. Even in contests between cultures
and their respective narratives where the dominant culture is successful,
there are different levels of success. The degree of success enjoyed by
one cultural discourse over another can be plotted on a continuum
between hegemony and ideology. 11 When a dominant culture manages
to impose a hegemonic relationship upon a subordinate cultural group,
its victory is very nearly total. Hegemony is characterized by the
adoption by the subordinate culture of the dominator's preferred modes
of discourse. Turpel invokes the words of Audre Lorde to describe this
situation as one where subordinate cultural groups are compelled to use
"the 'master's' language and conceptual apparatus to dismantle the
'master's' house." 12 Conversely, when the dominant discourse is forced
to confront an alternative discourse directly, the victmy that it achieves
is ideological rather than hegemonic. An ideological victory is one
where it is clear that a pariicular discourse is being imposed on a group
who would clearly prefer to narrate their experiences using an
alternative discourse. Though the subordinated group may be compelled
to continue using a discourse with which it is uncomfo1iable, the
dominant group is at least confronted with the alternative discourse and
is itself put in the uncomfortable position of having to account for it or
explain it away. When conflicts between narratives or discourses are
11
M. Lazarus-Black & S. Hirsch, Contested States: Law, Hegemony and Resistance (New
York: Routledge, 1994) at 8.
12
Turpel, supra note 1 at 504, quoting A. Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never
Dismantle the Master's House" in Sister Outsider (Trumansburg NY: The Crossing Press,
1984).
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decided ideologically rather than hegemonically, the operation of power
is made visible, and may be more easily recognized and combated.
When such discursive contests occur in Canadian constitutional
law, the stakes are high for all concerned. As the "supreme law of
Canada," the constitution is the textual foundation on which all legal
authority is ostensibly based. 13 If we view judicial interpretation of law
as the creation of nanatives that render disputes and their resolutions
intelligible and manageable, then it is in the area of constitutional law
that the temptation to create unifying meta-nanatives will be greatest. In
the specific context of Canadian constitutional law, the process of
constitutional decision-making may be seen as an act both of
interpretation and of representation. Particularly since the advent of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the debate over whether
judges merely interpret or actively represent constitutional law has
raged. 14 However, the questions about the henneneutical function of
judges in constitutional disputes may be leveled at all areas of
constitutional litigation. The power of the judicial interpreter lies in his
or her power to "inscribe" meaning, to fix words or groups of words
with a particular signifying force. As Geertz suggests, the analysis of
texts must look beyond the words themselves to this process of
inscription to gain a full understanding of the textual significance of
nanative configurations. 15 In Canadian constitutional litigation, this
process of inscription has a strong cultural element, and the meanings
that courts attach to the texts they interpret are, at least partially,
culturally detennined.
Given the cultural and linguistic differences between Quebec and
the rest of Canada, Re Secession is bound up in the debate over how
much power is to be attendant upon Quebec's status as home to the
largest and best-defined minority cultural group in Canada. The
arguments advanced in Re Secession are a part of the negotiations
between different ways of articulating the Canadian state, compelling
13

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K. ), 1982, c.

11.
14
See P. Hogg, "The Charter of Rights and American Theories oflnterpretation" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall L.J. 87; and R. Devlin, "Ventriloquism and the Verbal Icon: A Comment of
Professor Hogg's 'The Charter and American Theories oflnterpretation' "(1987) 26 Osgoode
Hall L.J. l.
15
Geertz, supra note 5 at 31.
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the Supreme Court of Canada to choose which alternative vision of the
country it will give legal effect to. Moreover, this case may be especially
susceptible to postmodern critique, as the Comi is compelled in its
judgment to depart from the comfortable realm of textual interpretation
and move into a more representational mode. In Re Secession, the Court
decides issues upon which Canada's constitutional text gives little
guidance. The Constitution is silent on the issue of the secession of
provinces from the federation. When freed from the Constitutional text
in the manner permitted by this issue, the Court gains great latitude for
the hegemonic or ideological imposition of dominant discourses on
subordinate groups.
Finally, a possible intersection between cultural and postmodern
critiques of law may be available in the work of theorists who explore
the possibility of"legal pluralism." Geertz thought of legal pluralism as
a means of comparing legal cultures without creating a subordinating
hierarchy; in order to talk about difference in an informative way,
Geertz felt that any such discussions should take alterity as their starting
point: "[M]uch is to be gained, scientifically and otherwise, by
confronting that grand actuality [alterity] rather than wishing it away in
a haze of forceless generalities and false comforts." 16 Lyotard's call for a
"justice of multiplicity," which would explode any one form of
narrative's claims to universality, 17 may also be seen as a call for a legal
pluralism. Given the fragmentation of interpretation inherent in
postmodernity, the claims to interpretive authority made by courts must
be scrutinized with an eye to their receptiveness to alterity. If Canada is
to live up to the label of"postmodern state," Canadian law must do more
than profess a tolerance for alterity. It must create a legal space in which
alterity may flourish, and strive for a "nonnative heterogeneity . . .
between various nonnative regimes which inhabit the same intellectual
space." 18

Ibid. at 234.
J.F. Lyotard, Just Gaming, trans. W. Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1985) at 100, quoted in Devlin, supra note 8 at 16.
18
M.M. Kleinhans & R.A. MacDonald, "What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?" (1997) 12
Can. J. L. & Soc'ty 25.
16

17
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II. DEFINING/INSCRIBING "CANADA":
REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC

Few recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have generated as
much publicity or attracted as much commentary from politicians and
the punditocracy as Reference Re Secession of Quebec. Before the
decision was handed down, the reference sparked debate among
federalists about the wisdom of "Plan B," and prompted recriminations
from sovereigntists about legal meddling in a purely political decision to
be made by the citizens of Quebec. On the day that the decision was to
be released, a photograph of a pensive Chief Justice Lamer made the
front page of the Globe and Mail, and photographs of all of the Justices,
accompanied by brief commentaries on their general political views,
were published as well. 19 CBC N ewsworld covered the decision in a live
report from the foyer of the Supreme Court. In the hours and days
following the release of the decision, political leaders from the both the
federalist and sovereigntist camps were quick to claim victory, mostly
by removing snippets of the judgment from their context and ignoring
the rest of a highly nuanced judgment. Prime Minister Chretien stated
that "the Court ha[ d] well served Canadians by bringing clarity to
certain fundamental rules which must guide our democratic life."20
Conversely, Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs minister Jacques
Brassard argued that
[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] recognized the democratic legitimacy of
both the option and the process leading up to the realization of the
sovereignty project, whereby a majority Yes vote would imply that the
federal government and the other provinces would have the obligation
to recognize the majority vote. 21

For my purposes, however, the most interesting aspect of the Globe's
coverage is a single sentence from an miicle by reporter Sean Fine, in
which he recounts some comments made by Major J. in a press
conference given after the judgment was released. According to Fine,
Tlze Globe and Mail [Toronto Metro Edition] (21August1998) Al, A4.
Quoted in G. Fraser, "Political Leaders React Cautiously" The Globe and Mail [Toronto
Metro Edition] (22 August 1998) AS.
21
Quoted in R. Seguin, "Ruling Legitimizes Sovereignty Drive, P.Q. Leaders Say" The
Globe and Mail (22 August 1998) A 7.
19

20
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"[a]s [the Court] saw it, their task was nothing less than to define the
nature of their country."22 The ability to "define" the nature of Canada
may be seen as the ultimate form of judicial power in this country, and in
Re Secession, the Court exercises that power in an unusually ove1i
fashion. The challenge to the Court's power to inscribe Canadian law in
Re Secession is so strong that the vict01y won by Canada's dominant
cultural discourses is far less complete than is usually the case.
Although dominant cultural assumptions are given voice in the
judgment, the Court is not able to subsume the caviling voice with its
usual degree of success.
The first indication that the Comi faces an ideological battle in Re
Secession and cannot simply hegemonically impose its preferred modes
of discourse on dissenting groups comes very early in the Court's
unanimous judgment. The decision begins with some general
commentary about the immense importance of the issues to be
discussed-issues that "go to the heart of our system of constitutional
govemment."23 However, before answering the three questions put to
the Court by the Governor-in-Council, the Court goes to some lengths to
establish a foundation for their pronouncements on those questions. The
Comi even seems to express a certain reluctance to speak to the
questions put to it. After affinning the constitutionality of section 53 of
the Supreme Court Act, 24 which allows the Court to express advisory
opinions on reference questions, the Court says that it "imposes a duty
on the Court to render" 25 those opinions. The Court concludes its
discussion of jurisdictional issues with a reiteration that it is "duty
bound"26 to answer the questions. However, despite this show of
reluctance, the Court does not seriously question its own power to
deliver authoritative opinions on the three questions. In its discussion of
"Justiciability," the Court takes great care to define its "proper role" and
its "area of expertise" in such a way as to allow a detennination of the
reference questions. The Court insists that it does not mean to "usurp

22

S. Fine, "Behind the Scenes as History was Made" The Globe and Mail (22 August 1998)

Al.

Re Secession, supra note 2 at para. 1.
R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26.
25
Re Secession, supra note 2 at para. 8.
26
Ibid. at para. 31.
23

24
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any democratic decision that the people of Quebec may be called upon
to make" as was contended by the amicus curiae. 27 Instead, the Court's
proper role is "strictly limited" to setting out the legal framework in
which such a decision would be taken. 28 One wonders whether this role
is "limited" at all, let alone "strictly limited" as the Court suggests. The
Court implies that its pronouncements will merely provide a legal
framework within which Quebeckers will be able to proceed toward a
democratic and legal declaration of sovereignty.
In creating a space in which it may speak authoritatively, the Court
argues that it has jurisdiction to answer questions that fall "within its
area of expertise: the interpretation oflaw."29 Although this statement of
the Court's area of expertise is framed to give the impression of
modesty, the claim to authority that the Court makes in gathering this
power to itself is significant. This apparent modesty is made possible by
the Court's rather sanguine assertion that, even where the questions may
raise extra-legal issues, the Court "may interpret the question so as to
answer only its legal aspects."30 However, the Court does not give any
indication of its opinion about where the "legal" ends and where the
"extra-legal" begins, although they hold up the distinction between the
two as part of their claim to interpretive authority. This may be an
unstable foundation on which to build, since postmodern jurisprudents
and cultural theorists have argued that it is impossible to hive off a realm
of "the legal" from the rest of social and political discourse.
N eve1iheless, the very fact that the Court takes such care to justify its
speech before speaking about the issues before it suggests an awareness
that Re Secession requires a foray into an ideological battle, rather than a
mere imposition of a hegemonic fonn of discourse.
After dispensing with the supposedly preliminary issues of
jurisdiction and justiciability, the Supreme Court begins creating a
unifying mythology as the basis of Canadian law, and in the process
bolsters its authority to interpret, shape, and create that law. In "Nomos
and Narrative," Robert Cover describes precisely the kind of enabling
narrative that the Supreme Court of Canada seeks to create when he
asserts that
Ibid. at para. 27.
Ibid.
29
Ibid. at para. 26.
30
Ibid. at para. 28.
27

28
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[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution
there is an epic, for each decalogue there is a scriptive. 31

In explaining this necessary step in the creation of a legal regime, Cover
develops the idea of"Nomos." A Nomos is a "world oflaw" arising out
of a population's deepest desires and knowledge, comprising "visions,"
"constructions of reality," and "norms." 32 The Supreme Court of
Canada's efforts to create a Nomos in Re Secession are most visible in
two aspects of the judgment: the Court's review of the origins of the
Canadian federation and their description of the four principles that
underlie Canadian constitutional law.
The po1iion of the judgment entitled "Historical Context: The
Significance of Confederation" is the most blatant attempt in the
judgment to create a nan-ative that will lend stability to Canadian
federalism and the rule of law. This is an interesting manoeuvre on the
Court's part, because it is in the writing of the history of Confederation
that anglophone and francophone academics in Canada have differed
considerably. In Canadian historical studies, culture has demonstrated
its power to shape understanding. Among francophone historians, the
version of Canadian history that has found most currency is the
"compact theory" of Confederation, which casts the Canadian federal
union as a "compact" between Canada's two founding nations, the
British and the French. 33 This nan-ative of Confederation views the two
founding nations, rather than the four initial provincial bodies, as the
crucial parties to the agreement to unify under the aegis of Canada.
While this version of Canadian history has long been popular among
academics in Quebec, it has not found much support among leading
Anglo-Canadian historians, who like Donald Creighton, have
aiiiculated a theory of Confederation that posits a Canadian state where
power is centred in and exercised by, the federal govemment. 34 Some
legal academics in Quebec have discerned a similar leaning in the
31

R. Cover, "Nomos and Narrative" in M. Minow, M. Ryan & A. Sarat, eds., Narrative,
Violence and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan
Press, 1992) at 95-96.
32
Ibid. at 132.
33 G. Marchildon & E. Maxwell, "Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and
International Law" (1992) 32 Va. J. Int'! L. 583 at 593.
34
Ibid. at 595.
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jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, and have argued that the
Court performs a "political function." In describing Quebecois
perspectives on the Supreme Court, Andre Bzdera argues that "[s]a
fonction principale est de promouvoir, en association avec les autres
institutions de l 'Etat central, la centralisation graduelle des pouvoirs
etatiques. " 35
So, in venturing into the contested ground of the history and
purpose of Confederation, the Court was faced with two potentially
irreconcilable narratives of Canadian history. The Supreme Court seeks
to inscribe that history as the foundation of the Canadian constitutional
order, so it is forced to navigate and ultimately choose between two
"nomoi," to use Cover's terminology. In so doing, the Court steps into
volatile territory. According to Cover, when nomoi collide, "[t]he
discontinuities between the respective visions, constructions of reality,
and norms by some such associations and by the state's authoritative
legal institutions may be considerable."36 In order to overcome such
discontinuities, Cover calls for a "redemptive constitutionalism"
capable of reconciling different nomoi by way of a "transfonnational
politics that cannot be contained within the autonomous insularity" of
either cultural group. 37 Cover's idea of redemptive constitutionalism
may be seen as another manifestation of "legal pluralism"-a world of
law that is capable of recognizing competing legal paradigms without
forcing subordinate groups to mold their language and thinking to suit
the preferences of the dominant group.
The Supreme Court of Canada's summary of Canadian political
history from 1864 to the present makes little attempt to articulate such a
transformational politics. What recognition the court does offer
regarding the cultural diversity that pre-existed the Confederation
agreement is overtaken by a narrative that casts the four initial provinces
as equal pminers in the agreement. Moreover, the Comi places great
emphasis on the choice of a federal fonn of government, describing it as
a way of successfully, perhaps even finally, reconciling the differing
interests of the four entities who sent delegates to the various

35 A. Bzdera, "Perspectives quebecoises sur la Cour Supreme du Canada" (1992) 7 Can. J.
L. & Soc'ty 1 at 16.
36
Cover, supra note 31 at 132.
37
Ibid.
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conferences that developed the British North America Act 1867. The
Court insists that the terms of the Confederation agreement satisfied the
demands of Quebec, as there were included in the agreement
guarantees to protect French language and culture, both directly (by
making French an official language in Quebec and Canada as a whole)
and indirectly (by allocating jurisdiction over education and "Property
and Civil Rights in the Province" to the provinces). 38

The effect of these "guarantees," in the Supreme Court's opinion, was
to reaffirm "the protection of minorities."39 It is worth noting that the
Court chooses the word "minority" to describe Quebec in this context,
and not a potentially more powerful word like "culture." Nevertheless,
the Court's description of the history of Canada's constitutional
structure does not obliterate the importance of culture to the
arrangement. The court describes federalism as "a legal response to the
underlying political and cultural realities that existed at Confederation
and continue to exist today." 40 This assertion suggests that
Confederation was contingent upon certain independent cultural
realities.
Still, the logic of the Court's description of Confederation suggests
that, though "cultural realities" may have preceded the federal
arrangement, having confederated, cultural minorities gave up their
claim to cultural authority and exchanged their status as relatively
autonomous cultural groups for membership in the federation.
According to the Court,
[t]he federal-provincial division of powers was a legal recognition of
the diversity that existed among the initial members of Confederation,
and manifested a concern to accommodate that diversity within a
single nation by granting significant powers to provincial
governments. The Constitution Act, 1867 was an act of nation
building. 41

In this passage, the Comi severely curtails the authority that may be
claimed by appealing to cultural difference. Recognitions of cultural
diversity are followed closely by references to unity which seem to
trump any authority that may be derived from that alterity. The Court
38
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comes closest to recognizing a genuine cultural alterity in Quebec in the
section of the judgment extolling the virtues of federalism, where the
Court admits that Quebec is unique in that "the majority of the
population is French-speaking" and that Quebec possesses "a distinct
culture."42 However, the recognition the Court does give to Quebec's
alterity does not permit a recognition of even the possibility of
incommensurability, or the presence of an alternative "N omos" unique
to Quebec. Quebec's distinctiveness is no different, in the Court's view,
from that of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, "both of which also
affilmed [in welcoming federalism] their will to protect their individual
cultures."43 The Court's emplotment of Canadian law moves ineluctably
toward a unity that may gesture at tolerating cultural alterity, but
severely circumscribes that alterity' s operation as a legal force by
creating all alterities equal; the law of the state overtakes culture and
asserts its limiting power on cultural alterity.
After constructing its problematic account of Canada's
constitutional history, the Court draws certain conclusions from its
historical summary:
We think it apparent even from this brief historical review that the
evolution of our constitutional arrangements has been characterized
by adherence to the rule of law, respect for democratic institutions, the
accommodation of minorities, insistence that governments adhere to
constitutional conduct and a desire for continuity and stability. 44

However, when the Court proceeds to discuss the "principles" that
ostensibly govern the Canadian constitutional order, it attempts to
explain the relationship between those principles, Canadian history, and
the text of the Constitution:
Our Constitutional text is primarily a written one, the product of 131
years of evolution. Behind the written word is an historical lineage
stretching back through the ages, which aids in the consideration of the
underlying constitutional principles. These principles inform and
sustain the constitutional text: they are the vital unstated assumptions
upon which the text is based. 45
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This is an interestingly circuitous statement. The court begins in the
comfortable realm of textual certainty, with a supposedly knowable
"written" text. Nevertheless, there exists "behind" the text an historical
naffative from which the Court intuits principles. These principles in
tum are employed to "inform and sustain" the text. Ultimately, the
principles or "vital unstated assumptions" seem to supercede the text, as
the Court announces its intention to evaluate unilateral secession with
reference to the principles, despite the Court's inability to clearly state
their provenance. The Court seems perfectly content with the principles,
despite their origins "behind the written word," "underlying" the text,
and as "unstated assumptions." That contentment justifies the Court's
movement from an interpretive function to a freer, more
representational one. Even though the principles are "not explicitly
made part of the Constitution by any written provision," it would
nevertheless "be impossible to conceive of our constitutional structure
without them." 46 The Court requires these principles to enable a
conceptual process, though the court does not acknowledge that the
principles themselves, and their connection to history and the text of the
Constitution, were in fact conceived. Instead, relying on the Patriation
Reference, the comi insists the principles "are not merely descriptive,
but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding
on both courts and govemments."47
In elaborating the four constitutional principles of federalism,
democracy, the protection of minorities, and the mle of law, the Court
stresses the idea that they operate in concert: "These defining principles
function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined in isolation
from the others, nor does any one principle tmmp or exclude the
operation of any other."48 Although the scientific-sounding concept of
"symbiosis" may give the illusion of precision and reliability to this
pronouncement, the Court's treatment of the "principle of effectivity"
raised in argument by the amicus curiae shows that one of the four
principles may clearly take precedence over the others. The argument
for effectivity forces the Court to confront the possibility of Quebec's
exercising a raw political power untrammelled by legal niceties. Not
46
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surprisingly, the Court's discussion of effectivity is peremptory. Instead
of locating effectivity in a cultural context that might lend some
credence to Quebec's desire for cultural self-determination, the Court
forces the principle of effectivity into the confines of a discourse with
which the Court is very familiar: the discourse of rights:
A distinction must be drawn between the right of a people to act, and
their power to do so. They are not identical. A right is recognized in
law: mere physical ability is not necessarily given status as a right. 49

This is an interesting discursive move, especially since the Court, in its
discussion of the jurisdictional issues that preceded its answers to the
reference questions, had asserted that "[n]o matter how closely the
procedure on a reference may miITor the litigation process, a reference
does not engage the court in a disposition of rights." 50
Nevertheless, the Court does make use of the discourse of rights to
contain the potentially destabilizing influence of a recognized power of
effectivity grounded in cultural alterity. The phenomenon of "rightstalk" has been criticized for its tendency to decontextualize disputes and
oversimplify difficult political situations. In criticizing the application
of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Allan C. Hutchinson
argues that
[i]t is not possible to think ofrights-talk as an autonomous discourse. It
is part of politics, not a precondition or boundary to the legitimate
realm of contested politics. Lawyers and Judges cannot exculpate
themselves from the charge of exercising arbitrary power by
expressing their decisions in the familiar rhetoric ofrights-talk. 51

By framing the issue of effectivity in the language of rights, the
Supreme Court of Canada defines the question as an either/or
proposition; either Quebec has "the right" to realize secession by way of
effective control or it does not. In addition to obscuring the political and
cultural forces that underlie a claim to effectivity, the Court's decision
to impose the discourse of rights upon the question of effectivity may tilt
the discursive field against Quebec's claim. Effectivity, if it were seen
as a right, would be a collective right to be exercised by the government
Ibid. at para. 106.
Ibid. at para. 25.
51
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of Quebec on behalf of its citizens. However, as Turpel has argued,
rights as they are conceived of in Canadian law are primarily
individualistic, and "are seen as a special zone of exclusion where the
individual is protected against harm from others." 52 Given its preference
for individualistic formulations, the discourse of rights as it is used in
Canadian law militates against the conceptualization of a collective
subjectivity that would be a necessary precondition of recognizing
effectivity; a right requires a right-holder.
Closely connected to the idea of rights, both theoretically and in the
Supreme Court's decision in Re Secession, is the notion of the rule of
law. The rule of law's rise as a fundamental legal principle coincided
with the rise of the nation state in the nineteenth centu1y. Although
appeals to the rule of law as a bulwark against the excesses of absolute
monarchs and military power have been made since medieval times, it
was in the nineteenth century that the rule of law took its CUITent form
through "the association of rule-governance with formal state
structures, an association epitomized by the notion of the 'lawstate' or
'state of law. "' 53 Given this close connection between the rule of law
and the nation-state, it is not surprising that the rnle oflaw plays such an
important part in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Re
Secession-a case that contemplates the dissolution, or at least a major
revisioning, of an existing state. When he announced his intention to
send the reference questions to the Court, Justice Minister Alan Rock
placed great emphasis on the rule of law in his statements in the House
of Commons. 54 Before the decision was handed down, commentators
speculated as to how the Comi would account for the rule of law in its
decision, and the consensus was that it should be given paramount
importance. The comments of H. Wade McLauchlan are typical:
a sane and effective political process requires a legal framework, both
constitutional and international. That is particularly true for such
potentially traumatic legal events as secession from a long-standing
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federation. There must be a legal framework-a rule oflaw. And there
must be a mutual willingness to respect it. 55

McLauchlan's article is also typical in that it treats the rule of law as
self-evident and incontestable. In this regard, McLauchlan accurately
predicts the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in Re Secession.
In discussing the rule of law, the Court calls it "a fundamental
postulate of our constitutional structure." 56 The textual basis on which
the rule of law rests in the Canadian Constitution is section 52 of the
Canada Act, 1982 that establishes the Constitution as "the supreme law
of Canada." The Court calls this section the embodiment of "[t]he
essence of constitutionalism" 57 in Canada, and insists that any
movement toward secession, negotiated or otherwise, must be made in
conformity with the Constitution. However, in the context of secession,
the meaning of section 52 becomes problematic. The section
presupposes an agreed-upon jurisdiction that it calls "Canada." The
Court does not consider how the meaning of"Canada" would be altered
by a successful sovereignty referendum, or the ways in which its
meaning may be fluid even now. The meaning ascribed to that term is
indeterminate, and is, at least in part, a cultural phenomenon. The
meaning of "Canada" relies on certain assumptions about the
relationship between law and society. Given the Court's long discussion
of the development of the Canadian state, one of these assumptions is
that a society of persons came together to create a unified system of
legal regulation and labeled it "Canada." However, when confronted
with the possibility of secession, the Supreme Court makes law anterior
to society-the boundaries of society are set with reference to law,
rather than the other way round. In such a formulation, society becomes
the product of law. As Roger Cotterell observes, "[t]he stability of the
idea of law as essentially state law, the law of the nation state, has
depended on the continued possibility of treating state and nation as
cote1minous-having the same scope, as in the nation state concept. 58
55
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By asserting the primacy of the Constitution as the "supreme law of
Canada," the Court establishes a unitary legal consciousness that does
not allow space for a culturally based legal subjectivity.
In the event of a successful sovereignty referendum, the meaning
of "Canada" would be bedeviled by indeterminacy, not only for
francophone Quebeckers, but for anglophone Canadians too. Any
appeals then made to the importance of the "supreme law of Canada"
would be oflittle persuasive force. In assuming that the requirement that
all governmental action must be "legal" under the Constitution, the
Court inscribes the meaning of "Canada" as a knowable and definable
concept, instead of recognizing that it can only sustain a meaning that
citizens are willing to give. Nor does the Court acknowledge that the
content of the meaning given to "Canada" may be influenced by cultural
difference. Seen in this light, the Court's suggestions regarding how a
negotiated settlement would be reached in the wake of a "yes" vote
begin to ring hollow. After describing a litany of potentially intractable
practical problems that would require attention in such a negotiation, the
Court insists that these problems would have to be resolved "within the
overall framework of the rule of law," in order to ensure a "measure of
stability."59 By stressing the importance of stability in areas like internal
trade and the protection of minority interests, the Supreme Court of
Canada fails to recognize the more fundamental destabilizing effect that
a recognition of cultural sovereignty must create for the meaning and
role of Canadian law. In fact, by asserting that the rule of law would
continue unimpeded, the Court is implicitly stating that cultural
difference may only exist within the confines that are set out in the
Canadian constitution, and may not fonn the basis of any legal argument
in favour of separation.
The role of the rule of law, in the words of the Court, is that it
"vouchsafes to the citizens and residents of the country a stable,
predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their affairs. " 60 In
this formulation, the rule of law serves as a means of protecting the
interests of individual citizens-no reference is made to the interests of
significant groupings of citizens. This preoccupation with individuals
rather than groups or cultures is repeated throughout the Court's
59
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discussion of the rule oflaw, and its effect is to divide governments from
their citizens. It prevents the government of Quebec from becoming the
vehicle for the expression of French-Canadian cultural aspirations. By
focusing so unswervingly on the obligations of governments to their
citizens, the Court discounts the possibility that citizens may choose to
give voice to a cultural goal through their governments. This focus on
the individual as the primary unit of legal subjectivity is a fundamental
aspect of "liberal" conceptions of law. 61 In Re Secession, the Supreme
Court of Canada's articulation of the rule of law as a bulwark against
unconstitutional government action reinforces this "liberal" atomism.
By seeing certain individual rights as pre-eminent and disallowing
government actions that would violate those rights, the Court makes
collective, cultural action a virtual impossibility. This assumption that
the individual is the primary unit of legal subjectivity is so ingrained in
Canadian law that it becomes difficult to see that the status given to the
individual is chosen rather than self-evident. As Kleinhaus and
MacDonald observe: "Legal subjects are exclusively constituted by law,
and legal subjectivity is concomitant with the criteria ofidentification in
each such legal order." 62 By inscribing the rule of law in Canada along
liberal lines, and thereby fixing the individual as the essential "buildingblock" of Canadian society, the Court prevents the development of a
legal consciousness that allows space for arguments based on cultural or
linguistic difference. A focus on individual rights prevents the
emergence of group rights, and forecloses any possibility that a group
may express an effective legal subjectivity under the Canadian
constitution.
The Court does allow the possibility that a effective legal
subjectivity may be available to cultural groups at international law
during their discussion of the second question put to the court in Re
Secession. The Court acknowledges that "[t]he existence of the right of
peoples to self-determination is now so widely recognized that the
principle has acquired a status beyond "convention" and is considered a
general principle of international law."63 In deciding whether that right
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is applicable to the hypothetical situation of a unilateral declaration of
Quebec independence, the Court considers this "general principle" in
such a way as to leave the possibility of cultural authority indeterminate.
The Court is of the opinion that it need not evaluate whether or not
Quebeckers constitute a "people" within the meaning of the principle in
order to make a determination on the existence of any right of unilateral
secess10n:
While much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the
characteristics (such as a common language and culture) that would be
considered in determining whether a specific group is a "people" ... it
is not necessary to explore this legal characterization to resolve
Question 2 appropriately. 64

Instead, the court determines its answer to Question 2 by exploring the
scope of the right to self-detennination. After reviewing a number of
international treaties and conventions and stating the respect accorded at
international law for the "teITitorial integrity of existing states," 65 the
Court decides that the right to self-determination may only be asserted
in situations of former colonies, where a people is oppressed, as for
example under military occupation; or where a definable group is
denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political,
economic, social and cultural development. 66

After setting out these specific criteria, the Court quickly detennines
that Quebec, whether comprising a "people" or not, does not fit the
definition.
This analysis is troubling, given the Court's refusal to decide the
preliminary question of whether Quebeckers are a "people." The Court
here suggests that the scope of the right can be understood without
reference to the status of the people seeking to exercise it. Furthennore,
any detenninations that the Court makes with regard to the status of
Quebec is framed negatively-Quebeckers are not oppressed, nor are
they denied access to government, and so on. If the Court were to make
culturally-based arguments possible in the deciding of this question, it
would be required to recognize Quebec as some sort of cultural legal
entity instead of merely as a province within the Canadian constitution.
Ibid. at para. 125.
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By divorcing the operation of the right from the subjectivity of the entity
seeking to gain that right, the Court decontextualizes the right to the
point of unintelligibility.

III.

CONCLUSION

In Re Secession, Canadian law fails to live up to the challenges of
postmodemity and cultural pluralism. In its judgment, the Supreme
Court of Canada deploys powerful discourses and narratives to
configure legal issues and shape legal subjectivity in such a way as to
prevent the emergence of a genuine legal pluralism allowing scope for
the articulation of cultural difference. In order to take up the challenge
of postmodemity in a culturally various society, the Supreme Court of
Canada must revision its hermeneutical role and praxis. A respect for
cultural difference and the potentially incommensurable interpretive
difference that accompanies it would require the Court to assume the
role of hermeneutical mediator, and relinquish its monopoly on
interpretive power. In the division of powers context, this means making
room for cultural arguments instead of insisting on tests that occlude
culture and allow the extension of federal power even when there exists
no intellectual space for provincial arguments that rest on an authority
derived from cultural alterity. The Court must also be wary of the
creation of meta-narratives that inscribe "Canada" with a meaning that
is culturally specific, and eschew the sorts of discursive moves that, in
Re Secession, prevent the development of a legal subjectivity founded
on cultural difference. As Dallmayr observes,
[h]ermeneutical mediation comes to an end whenever one party
arrogates to itself a sovereign prerogative, that is, the capacity to
determine the meaning oflegal and other texts unilaterally in a binding
fashion. 67

In Re Secession, the Supreme Court of Canada performs just such a
unilateral arrogation of interpretive power; in order to live up to the
requirements of a genuine cultural pluralism and create a concomitant
legal pluralism, the Court must allow space for difference and listen
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when that difference is articulated. This listening would require a
fundamental re-evaluation of the political utility of a number of the
Supreme Court of Canada's interpretive tools, such as narrative, rightstalk, and the rule of law. Although such a revisioning would be radical
and difficult, and would likely displace the accepted meaning of legal
"statehood,'' it is nevertheless necessary to the project of making the
Canadian state genuinely "postmodern."

